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JURY INSTRUCTION ERROR REQUIRES REVERSAL 
IF, ABSENT THE ERROR, THERE IS A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD 
THAT THE RESULT WOULD BE MORE FAVORABLE TO THE APPELLANT. 
The standard of review that applies to jury-instruction 
error is less onerous than Mrs. Brady suggests. An appellant 
need not show actual prejudice, as Mrs. Brady implies. (Brady 
Brief, p. 1.) Rather, the Rowley case, cited by Mrs. Brady, 
states that where a reasonable likelihood exists that in the 
absence of jury-instruction error, the trial result would have 
been more favorable to the appellant, the trial court should be 
reversed. Rowley v. Graven Bros. & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P.2d 
1209, 1211 (1971). Based on the Utah Supreme Court's guidance in 
Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270 (Utah 1992), this 
court should presume reversible error from the unexplained use of 
a "common knowledge exception" instruction with an instruction 
mandating reliance upon expert testimony because in such a case, 
"there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict may 
have been different absent the error." Id. at 275. Like in 




ERROR MUST BE PRESUMED FROM THE USE OF 
CONFLICTING "COMMON KNOWLEDGE" AND "EXPERT TESTIMONY 
REQUIRED" JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
One express reason the trial court dismissed 
Mrs. Brady's res ipsa loquitur claim was because of expert 
opinions about the use and application of Exidine. (T. 1165.) 
The court's reliance on expert opinion to dismiss the res ipsa 
loquitur claim also illustrates the likelihood for confusion it 
caused by allowing the "common knowledge" instruction to remain 
in the case. 
This court should focus on the Nielsen case because in 
Nielsen harm was presumed from the use of a "common knowledge" 
jury instruction even though res ipsa loquitur was a viable 
theory and was presented to the jury. 830 P.2d at 272. In this 
case there should be an even greater presumption of harm to Dr. 
Gibb from the use of Instruction No. 20, the "common knowledge" 
instruction, because res ipsa loquitur was not a viable theory 
and was not presented to the jury in any form. 
In Nielsen, because theories of res ipsa loquitur and 
common law negligence were presented to the jury, the trial court 
was criticized because it did not limit the application of the 
conflicting instructions to the theories to which they apply. 
Id. at 274-75. The court did not clarify its instructions to 
help jurors separate the common law negligence theory that 
required expert testimony from the res ipsa loquitur theory that 
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allows jurors to derive standards of care from their own 
experience. Id. 
Here, the potential for substantial confusion is 
greater than in Nielsen because although the trial court allowed 
Mrs. Brady's counsel to argue res ipsa loquitur principles in his 
opening statement (T. 33-35, 220), at the close of plaintiff's 
evidence the trial court dismissed Mrs. Brady's res ipsa loquitur 
claim. (T. 1164-65) Later, the trial court gave Instruction No. 
20, the "common knowledge" instruction even though there was no 
corresponding theory left in the case to which the instruction 
applied. (T. 1414-15.) Because the court also gave Instructions 
18 and 19, which appropriately told the jurors that they may not 
rely upon their own standards of care but must rely on expert 
testimony, this court should presume that the jury was confused. 
POINT III 
EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THE 
SPECIFIC STANDARDS OF CARE IN THIS CASE THAT 
ARE BEYOND A JURY'S COMMON NOTIONS OF MEDICAL PROPRIETY. 
Expert medical testimony is required to show "what the 
usual outcome of a medical procedure would be when the required 
due care is employed." Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 353 
(Utah 1980). Expert testimony is not necessary only where the 
facts of a case are such that a jury's common knowledge enables 
them to know that the outcome of a medical procedure is so 
remotely related to the procedure, like broken teeth during knee 
surgery, Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah 
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1992), or, in some cases, a lost surgical instrument. Nixdorf v. 
Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 1980); Frederickson v. Maw. 119 
Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772, 772-73 (1951). As noted by Justice 
Stewart, even where a surgical instrument is lost in the patient, 
the "common knowledge" exception may not always apply. Nixdorf 
at 355. In such a case, expert testimony could explain a 
reasonable non-negligent basis for losing a needle in a patient, 
such as slippage due to lubrication or a defective needle-holding 
implement. Id. at 356. Where, like in this case, expert 
testimony established standards of care and explained a bad 
result even where those standards were met, the "common-
knowledge" jury instruction, Instruction 20, had no role and only 
created confusion by its use. Jd. at 355-57. 
Expert testimony was required in this case because the 
standards of care in this case are more specific and complex than 
the generic platitudes described by Mrs. Brady. (Brady Brief, p. 
15-16.) The standards of care in this case are such that the 
jury had to rely only upon experts to determine what Dr. Gibb 
should have known, and how and when he should have known it. 
Dr. Gibb testified that prior to performing surgery on 
Mrs. Brady, he had no knowledge that Exidine was a toxic 
solution. (T. 1183-85.) Dr. Gibb had never received any 
information about the toxicity of Exidine from any source, 
including literature provided to doctors in his specialty, from 
4 
local or national meetings for doctors in his specialty, or from 
the manufacturer of Exidine. Id. 
Mrs. Brady called Dr. Mark S. Granick to testify 
concerning what Dr. Gibb should have known about Exidine, and how 
and when he should have known it. (T. 735, 743-44.) Although 
not a practicing otolaryngologist (T. 753), Dr. Granick testified 
that Dr. Gibb, a practicing otolaryngologist, should have been 
aware of prepping solution warnings. (T. 735-36.) 
Dr. Gibb called Dr. G. Marsden Blanch, a practicing 
otolaryngologist from Salt Lake City, to testify concerning 
standards of care and Dr. Gibb's conduct that met those 
standards. (T. 1264-66.) Dr. Blanch testified that Dr. Gibb's 
use of Exidine was appropriate based on the information available 
to otolaryngologists at the time. Id. at 1264. Dr. Blanch 
testified that it was not a breach of a standard of care for an 
otolaryngologist to not consult the Physician's Desk Reference 
before using solutions in the operating room. (T. 1265.) 
Dr. Blanch also testified that a failure to read labels on 
preparation solutions prior to prepping the patient was not a 
breach of the standard of care. (T. 1265-66.). Dr. Blanch 
concluded that Dr. Gibb did not violate any standard of care in 
the use of chlorhexidine because of the lack of information 
available to otolaryngologists. (T. 1276-77.) 
A particularly good example of the need for expert 
testimony on what, how and when Dr. Gibb should have known about 
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Exidine is the testimony of Dr. Blanch in response to cross-
examination by Mrs. Brady7s counsel. As noted in Mrs. Brady's 
Brief, Dr. Blanch did testify that based upon the 1988 
Physician's Desk Reference, Dr. Gibb "violated" the Physician 
Desk Reference instruction and label warning. (Brady Brief, 
p. 20; T. 1211-IS.) However, the so-called "violation" of the 
Physician's Desk Reference and the Stuart Pharmaceutical label 
warning did not constitute a breach of the standard of care. 
Dr. Blanch, as noted above, testified that he knew of no surgeon 
who read a prepping solution warning label prior to surgery, and 
also established that reading the Physician's Desk Reference 
prior to using a prepping solution was not a standard of care for 
an otolaryngologist. (T. 1265-66.) Dr. Blanch's testimony is 
but one example of the importance to Dr. Gibb's case that the 
jurors clearly know that expert medical testimony is the only 
appropriate source to determine standards of care. 
In this case it was prejudicial to the parties to allow 
a jury to disregard necessary expert testimony and rely on 
"notions of medical propriety," Nixdorf, 830 P.2d at 353, because 
those notions were naturally insufficient, without expert 
testimony, to understand the relationship between information 
available to Dr. Gibb and how the lack of information impacted 
the medical procedure and the outcome of the procedure. 
A "common knowledge" instruction is not given just 
because the outcome of a medical procedure is unusual. Such an 
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instruction should never be given where expert medical testimony 
can link the procedure to the outcome. When, like in the present 
action, medical testimony is presented to explain and link the 
outcome with the propriety of the procedure, the expert testimony 
takes the analysis beyond the lay person's common knowledge and 
experience. The expert testimony presented by all parties in 
this case elevated the standard of care issues above a lay jury's 
knowledge and experience and should have properly taken from them 
the ability to rely upon their own "notions of medical 
propriety." Consequently, this Court should presume error from 
the trial court's use of a "common knowledge" jury instruction in 
tandem with an instruction mandating reliance only on expert 
testimony. 
POINT IV 
DR. COOK WAS NOT A PROPER REBUTTAL WITNESS 
BECAUSE HIS TESTIMONY WAS USED TO CONTRADICT 
EVIDENCE THAT COULD HAVE BEEN REASONABLY ANTICIPATED 
PRIOR TO TRIAL. 
Mrs. Brady argues that Dr. Cook was a proper rebuttal 
witness because his testimony contradicted the testimony of 
Dr. Randall Olsen. (Brady Brief, p. 29.) That argument only 
reinforces Dr. Gibb's position that Dr. Cook was not a proper 
rebuttal witness. Rebuttal testimony is proper only to 
contradict evidence of the opposing party and only to contradict 
evidence that could not have reasonably been anticipated prior to 
trial. Dr. Olsen's testimony was introduced at trial through the 
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reading of his deposition. Obviously, every word of Dr. Olsen's 
testimony was well-known to plaintiffs before trial and the use 
of Dr. Olsen's deposition testimony at trial should have been 
anticipated by Mrs. Brady. Mrs. Brady's attempt to contradict 
Dr. Olsen's testimony with Dr. Cook should have been disclosed to 
all defendants well before trial. The failure to do so makes 
Dr. Cook an improper rebuttal witness. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER PRESUMES THAT DR. GIBB 
DID NOT WAIVE ANY OBJECTION TO DR. COOK'S 
TESTIMONY AND PRESUMES THAT DR. GIBB'S OBJECTIONS 
WERE SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC AND TIMELY. 
Waiver, specificity, and timeliness of Dr. Gibb's 
objections to Dr. Cook's testimony were argued in the Motion for 
New Trial. (R. 1590-95, 1664-67, 1713-19.) The trial court 
implicitly recognized that Dr. Gibb did not waive any objection 
and that his objections were sufficient and timely when it made 
findings on three issues pertaining to Dr. Cook: (1) Was Dr. 
Cook a proper rebuttal witness? (2) Was Dr. Cook an improper 
surprise witness? and if Dr. Cook was a surprise witness, (3) 
What prejudice did defendants suffer from their inability to 
challenge Dr. Cook's qualifications and credibility with evidence 
of malpractice claims brought against him? (R. 1796-99, 
1800-08.) To reach conclusions on these three substantive 
issues, the trial court had to presume that Dr. Gibb did not 
waive his objections and that Dr. Gibb's objections were timely 
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and sufficient. Otherwise, the trial court would never have 
reached the three substantive issues but would have denied 
Dr. Gibb's motion on the procedural grounds of waiver, substance, 
and timing of Dr. Gibb's objections. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT RULED UPON, AND DR. GIBB ARGUED 
ABOUT THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXHIBITS 64 AND 65. 
The trial court's Order denying Dr. Gibb's Motion for a 
New Trial states: 
The court finds that the issue with respect 
to the admissibility of the testimony of 
Dr. Barry Cook and the admissibility of 
Exhibits 64 and 65 are very close 
calls. . . . The court further finds that it 
is a close call as to whether or not 
Dr. Cook's testimony and Exhibits 64 and 65 
have constituted surprise. 
(R. 1804.) Mrs. Brady is mistaken in her assertion that the 
trial court "did not consider the admissibility of Exhibits 64 
and 65 as a basis for granting a new trial." (Brady Brief, 
p. 3 6.) There can be no question but that the admissibility of 
Exhibits 64 and 65 are properly before this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For reasons of fundamental fairness, Dr. Gibb is 
entitled to a new trial. Based upon the Nielsen case, this Court 
should find that absent the jury instruction error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the trial result would have been more 
favorable to Dr. Gibb. The Court should also conclude that 
Dr. Cook should not have been allowed to testify. Dr. Cook was 
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an improper rebuttal witness. His testimony and supporting 
evidence, including Exhibits 64 and 65, constitute prejudicial 
surprise. This Court should reverse the Motion for New Trial 
ruling of the trial court and remand for a new trial. 
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